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Public officiaLs and elites in recent years tend 
to discuss high unemployment rates in public. but 
this was not always the case. Evidence gathered 
from the New York Times between 1890 and 1940 
indicate that high unemployment rates were Largely 
ignored prior to 1920. After that year, however, 
elite statements in the press reflect fLuctuations in 
the economy and expLicitly mention unemployment. 
Why did clites begin to recognize unem­
ployment as a public issue? A reasonable expla­
nation is that the working class gained some po­
litical influence. Such influence may ha ve come 
Crom disruption in the streets (Isaac and Kelly, 
1981; Piven and Cloward, 1977), or from the 
srengthening oC the Democratic Party, as it 
searched Cor a new constituency. 
Data and Analysis. In contrast to industrial 
violence, researchers have no easy direct source 
of data on protest by the unemployed. Indirect 
data are often found in extensively-indexed 
newspapers. (See, e.g., Jenkins and Perrow 1977; 
Tilly, Tilly, and Tilly 1975; Danzger, 1975; Sny­
der and Kelly 1977). 
Using the New York Times Index to locate 
newspaper articles about these events from 1890 
to 1940, our assistants then read and coded the 
original article in the Times. Including only 
protest events by the unemployed themselves 
(including public assistance recipients), 303 
protest even ts were coded. 1 
For a n accuracy check, we randomly selected 
six years and followed the same coding proce­
dures 2 and, for key time periods, examined ev­
ery page of the New York Times, reading arti­
cles related to our subject matter. 3 Codes were 
also corroborated by examining every page of 
the San Francisco Chronicle during key time pe­
riods for protest reports. 4 Each of the two news­
papers included minor local events not found in 
the other, but the total numbers of events were 
close for both newspapers. The New York Times 
da ta were also checked against nine major his­
torical works containing reports of collective 
protest by the unemployed. (Feder 1936; 
Schlesinger 1957, ]959, 1960; Goldman 1953; 
Garraty 1978; Hofstader 1955; Piven and 
Cloward 1971, 1977). 
We also coded 1,526 elite statements about 
economic conditions and unemployment. As be­
fore, we employed the New York Times Index 
(1890-1940) to determine that an opinion about 
the problems of the unemployed or general con­
ditions oC unemployment had been voiced by 
any specific person, oCficia I organiza tion 
(business group, religious group, or other volun­
tary organization), or government agency. The 
original New York Times article was then read 
and the necessary informa tion coded. 5 defi­Our 
nition of elites and influential organizations 
was very broad, bu t excl uded labor leaders and 
organizations.6 When statements by national po­
litical elites (president, vice president, cabinet 
members, top federal government agencies, and 
members of Congres~) were coded separately, 
they correlated .79 WIth those of overall elites. 
Therefore, this separate group was dropped 
from the analysis. Again, six years were ran­
domly selected for coding accuracy checks. 7 (We 
also examined the degree of sympathy expressed 
for the unemployed, but found that statements 
were quite mixed. Although Democrats were 
more inclined to make statements in support of 
the unemployed than Republicans, the latter 
tended to mix positive with negative statements.) 
Unemployment rates, the number of unem­
ployed, industrial conflict, election years, party 
in office, union membership, immigration, and 
population size of the working class were coded 
from official historical statistics.8 We also coded 
the length of a recession because it was believed 
this may have an effect on our primary depen­
dent variable, elite statements about unemploy­
ment. The assumption is that two or more con­
secutive years of high unemployment are more 
likely to generate concern than only one year. 
We defined a recession as eight percent unem­
ployment or higher (which conforms to the his­
torical descriptions of five major recessions in 
the period under analysis). The first year of 
eight percent unemployment was coded 1, the 
second year coded 2, etc. To test for the impor­
tance of party in office in explaining elite 
statements we created dummy variables for 
Democrat vs. Republican control of the House, 
Sena te, and Presidency. To test for the impor­
tance of "power struggles" during election peri­
ods we created a scale suggesting the importance 
of U.S. na tional elections. Non-election years 
were coded 1, off year elections we coded 2, and 
presidential elections were coded 3. 
Least squares with the Cochrane-Orcutt 
method of correcting for auto- correlation effect 
was the primary statistical technique used 
(Hibbs 1974; Johnston 1972; Kmenta 1971; Os­
trom 1978). All variables were logged to reduce 
skewness. It should also be noted that logic sug­
gests some lagged relationships may exist be­
tween some of our variables. However our use 
of lagged variables to test for this possibility 
indicated no significant lagged effects. 
Findings. It will be useful to begin with some 
historical description in reference to Figure I. 
As can be seen, elites expressed very little pub­
lic concern about working class issues such as 
unemployment until the 1920s, and the timing ?f 
the big increase seems rather unexpected \n 
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many ways. There were very serious levels of 
unemployment in time periods before the 1920s 
and relatively low unemployment in the 1920s: 
Th us, any explana tion of the poli ticiza tion of 
unemployment cannot rely primarily on changes 
in the level of unemployment. Before the 1920s 
we fou,nd public discussion about recessions by 
elites, 1ll the New York Times, but the discus­
sion was directed toward lost profits and the 
need to protect capitalists. For example in a 
time of high unemployment we found' many 
statements about the need for tariffs during the 
Presidential election of 1896' there was almost 
nothing said by the main Pres'identia1 contenders 
McKinley and Bryan on the problems of unem­
ployment. The working class did not seem to be 
of interest to national political elites before the 
1920s. 
All of this changed drastically during the 
1920s. When unemployment jumped to almost 12 
percent in 1921 there followed extensive na­
tional discussion of the problem. The Republi­
cans even felt compelled to appoint a commis­
sion to study the problem, headed by Herbert 
Hoover (Garraty 1978). Then again the issue of 
unemployment was raised extensively in the 
presiden tial election of 1928, and the off-year 
elections of 1930. But it is interesting to note 
tha t the election of 1928 was during a time of 
low unemployment. During the remainder of the 
1930s, of course, unemployment continues to be 
a major issue, especially during the election 
years. 
What we find, therefore, is a fundamentally 
different political environment after 1920, and 
especially so as we move into the 1930s. Our 
nex t major question, therefore, is what changed 
this political environment? Was it protest by the 
unemployed which made political elites listen to 
them and consider their problems? Figure 2 sug­
ges ts tha t protest by the unemployed was not a 
significant factor in the beginning of elite 
statements about unemployment in the 1920s. We 
found little protest by the unemployed before 
1930. Figures 1 and 2 together show that neither 
the rate of unemployment nor protest by the 
poor stimulated the elite recognition of unem­
ployment by the 1920s. But it is interesting to 
note that by the first hint of the depression of 
the 1930s (th.a t is, the year 1930), both elite 
sta temen ts and protest shot upward in response 
to onl y a bou t eight percent unemployment. 
There was certainly a changed political envi­
ronment, but it came before the long depression 
of the 1930s. 
We must turn to multivariate analysis to 
check for the effects of other variables on the 
increase in elite statements. When doing so our 
above analysis of Figures 1 and 2 are supported. 
Because of multicolinearity between unem­
ployment and political variables we are required 
to employ separate economic and political mod­
els. The following six regression equations (three 
fOr the economic model and three for the politi­
cal model) include the variables found signifi­
b 
cant for any time period, and are broken down 
for the 1891-1940 period, 1891-1919 and 1920­
1940 periods: 
Political Model 
1891-1940 
Elite Statements = 31.452 + 2.719 Protest -.013 Strikes + e 
(10.169) (.510) (.005) 
2
R=.66, R A = .41, P < .001, D.W. = 1.953 
1891-1919 
Elite Statements = 2.053 + .815 Protest -.001 Strikes + e 
(.995) (.519) (.001) 
2R=.46, R A = .15, P < .05, D.W. = 2.297 
1920-1940 
Elite Statements = 63.93 + 2.564 Protests -.018 Strikes + e 
(22.79) (.792) (.011) 
2R=.62, R A = .31, P < .05, D.W. = 1.537 
Economic Model 
1891-1940 
Elite Statements = -8.032 + 5.365 Unemployment Rate + e 
(6.601) (1.148) 
2R = .56, R A = .30, P< .001, D.W. = 2.546 
1891-1919 
Elite Statements = .971 + .406 Unemployment Rate + e�
(.999) (.187)� 
2R = .38, R A = .12, P < .05, D.W. = 1.559 
1920-1940 
Elite Statements = -3.279 + 6.051 Unemployment Rate + e 
(16.689) (1.427) 
2R =.70, R A = .46, P < .001, D.W. = 2.061 
The above regression equations were esti­
mated by least squares. Underneath each esti­
mated coefficient is the standard error of that 
coefficient, along with the R, adjusted R 2, sig­
nificance level, and Durbin-Watson statistics. 
Both the political model and economic model 
show protest and unemployment are related to 
elite statements, but this is primarily after the 
changed political environment in the 1920s. The 
same conclusion can be drawn from the path 
model in Figure 3 combining the effects of un­
employment and protest on elite statements. 
(Strikes were excluded from the path model be­
cause of their weak relationships to elite state­
ments.) The path model for the overall time pe­
riod is strong (R 2 =.37 P < .001), but the pathm~el for the 189t-1919 period is much weaker 
(R .A=.22, P < .05). For th'2 1920-1940 period the 
path model is strongest (R A=.44, P < .01). 
Conclusions. We must conclude that none of 
the independent variables measured in this 
analysis help us understand the politicization of 
the issue of unemployment beginning in the 
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1920s. The rate of unemployment and protest by 
the unemployed are more strongly related to 
eli te sta temen ts in the 1920-1940 time period. 
Significant protest by the unemployed did not 
begin until the 1930s, thus this cannot explain 
the emergence of elite statements in the 1920s. 
The rate of unemployment is clearly related to 
elite statements in the 1920s and 1930s, but the 
relationship was much weaker before the 1920s. 
In our view, the Piven and Cloward (1982) 
thesis about the politicization of working class 
issues seems most plausible. The political envi­
ronment changed in the 1920s because the 
Democratic Party began losing voters. They 
needed a new constituency to replace the older 
progressive coalition, and because of election 
laws and demography producing more potential 
working class voters, the Democratic Party went 
after the working class vote. To go after the 
working class the Democratic Party had to tell 
the working class what the political system 
could do for them. Our data indicate that the 
poli ticiza tion of working class issues began 
somewhat sooner than most people recognize 
(e.g., Garraty 1978; Piven and Cloward 1982), 
but the timing of this pOliticization (the early 
1920s) provides even stronger support for the 
idea that politicization of working class issues 
was the result of pOlitical elites seeking a new 
constituency -- this was the time Democrats be­
gan losing more and more elections. 
None of this is to suggest that protest activity 
and political violence are not primary ways that 
the lower classes have influenced the political 
system. The many studies providing empirical 
support for the Piven and Cloward (1971) thesis 
that welfare expansion in the United States has 
been the result of turmoil by the poor show the 
importance of political violence as a means of 
lower class political influence (e.g., Shram and 
Turbett 1983; Isaac and Kelly 1981). But our 
findings also suggest that the more recent view 
of Piven and Cloward (1982) is also accurate: 
there can be an expansion of democratic institu­
tions in capitalist societies so that the lower 
classes are able to gain some political influence 
through traditional party politics. Which is also 
to say that the dynamics of class conflict is 
much more complex than earlier mass society 
theorists such as C. Wright Mills (1956) recog­
nized. 
NOTES 
Revision of a raper presented at the meeting of the Interna­
tional Sociologiea Associations Research Committee on Social 
Stratification, Duisburg, West Germany, May, 1985. 
1. This coding procedure excluded primarily strikes or other 
collective action by the employed. Some of these events were on 
the behalf of the unemployed\ but it was difficult to separate out 
the most important issue benind the strike. Specifically, under 
protest by the unemployed we coded the number involved, loca­
tion, target, and goals of action, number arrested, injured, and 
killed. 
2. We selected 1908! 1913, 1920, 1921, 1922, and 1929 for va­
lidity checks. The overa I agreement rate was 87 percent. 
3. This method was employed to make sure the New York 
Times Index was accurate and employed accurately. Reading the 
entire Index was impossible, but we found some key index head-. 
ings most likely to contain the information required (especially 
"unemployment"). The years and month~ selected fo~ this analysis 
were selected because they were electIOn years wIth high un­
employment, but with very few protest events located in our cod­
ing procedure. The dates examined were January to March 1894 
August to November 1.894, August to November 1896, and August 
to November 1908. ThIS method strongly confirmed the validity of 
our coding procedures. 
4. The selection of time periods to reexamine in the San Fran­
cisco Chronicle followed the selection described in note 3 above. 
5. It is worth noting that none of the coders worked on both 
protests and elite statements. Such a procedure could have incor­
rectly inflated the relationship between the two variables. 
6. Our working assumption was that if a statement about the 
unemployed by an individual or group was emphasized in the New 
York Times Index, the group or individual should be considered 
elite. Such was not always the case, of course. Unfamiliar names 
were looked up in biographical sources if sufficient information was 
not in the newspaper article. The level of elite status was coded as 
city level, state level, or national level for organizations, and for 
the position held in the case of individuals. Elites and organiza­
tions were also divided into institutional sectors (e.g., political 
business, religious, charity, and other voluntary organizationsf 
Labor leaders and labor organizations were excluded because it 
was assumed they were more directly tied to the unemployed. We 
were more concerned with the actions of the lower classes (i.e., 
protest). 
7. The codin~ of elite statements proved to be a very difficult 
process for the' big years" (i.e., those years with 100 to 200 or 
more news articles containing elite statements). The New York 
Times Index was not always clear on whether or not a statement 
by an individual or organization was in the news article. Thus, 
judgment errors were made by coders, but primarily only in big 
years. A result is that we have an underestimate of elite state­
ments for the big years, which produces a conservative estimate of 
the number of elite statements. The years selected for recoding bl' 
the authors were 1908, 1913, 1920, 1921, 1922, and 1934. Overall 
coder agreement was 67 percent, and 72 percent for national po­
litical elites only. Excluding 1934 (a big year), however, coding 
agreement was 78 percent overall, and 92 percent for natioual level 
political elites. 
8. The source for unemployment rates, the number of unem­
ployed, immigration, working class population election years, and 
the party in office was, U.S. Bureau of Census, Historical Statistics 
of the United States, Colonial Times to 1970 (1975). The industrial 
conflict data was obtained from the HistOrical Statistics of the 
United States, Colonial Times to 1970, and John I. Griffin, Strikes: 
A Study in Quantitative Economics (1939). We included the data 
on the size of the working claBS and Immigration rate to check for 
the possible influence of these factors on elite recognition of unem­
ployment. Working class size showed no significant correlation to 
elite statements, but the immigration rate showed a surprisingly 
strong negative relation to elite statements. Using multivariate 
analysis, however, suggests this negative relation between immi­
gration and elite statements is due to the negative relation be­
tween immigration and unemployment. When unemployment went 
up there was usually reduction in immigration. 
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